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Okafor v Nweke [2007] 10 NWLR (Pt. 1043) 521 




This section of the article, examines the facts and decision in the Okafor’s Case by highlighting 
other decisions of both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court which the decision has been 
followed, it also contextualises the consequences of the decision on Nigeria justice delivery 
system. 
 
The brief facts of the case are as follows. It is not an exaggeration for one to assert that no 
decision of the Supreme Court has had such a devastating effect on Nigeria’s adjudicatory 
system than the decision in Okafor v. Nweke.2 The Respondent in the case, filed a Motion on 
Notice at the Supreme Court seeking inter alia, an order of extension of time within which to 
apply for leave to cross appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Enugu Division, 
delivered on the 25th day of January, 2001, and extension of time within which to file the 
Respondent/Applicant’s Notice of Cross Appeal. The Motion of Notice, Notice of Cross 
Appeal and the Applicant/Respondent Brief of Argument in support of the Motion on Notice, 
were all signed by the law firm of J.HC. Okolo, SAN & Co. In response to the Motion, the 1st-
3rd Respondents filed a counter-affidavit and a Brief of Argument and challenged the 
competence of the processes filed, challenging them on the ground that they were signed by a 
law firm as opposed to an animate legal practitioner in tandem with the provisions of Rule 10 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Legal Practitioners (RPCFLP). 
 
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous ruling delivered on the 9th day of March, 2007, considered 
the provisions of section 2(1) and 24 of the Legal Practitioners Act which defines who a legal 
practitioner is and held that the Motion on Notice, Notice of Cross Appeal and Brief of 
Argument all signed by the law firm of J.H.C. Okolo SAN & Co. were incompetent and 
according struck out the said processes. While the Court acknowledged the fact that prior to its 
decision, legal practitioners have formed the habit of signing court processes in their 
partnership or firm’s name without indicating the name of the practitioner. The court justified 
its striking out of the process the because of the way and manner they were signed thus: 
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… the need to arrest the current embarrassing trend in legal practice where authentication or 
franking of legal documents particularly processes for filing in the courts have not been 
receiving the serious attention they deserve from some legal practitioners. Legal practice is a 
very serious business that is to be undertaken by serious minded practitioners particularly as 
both the legally trained minds and those not so trained always learn from our examples. 
 
 
The Applicant had responded to the object that it was fanning to flame the embers of 
technicality which is inimical to substantial justice which the court is enjoined to do. The 
signing of the processes in the way and manner they were signed, is an act of the counsel which 
the litigant should not be punished, especially having regard to the fact that there was nothing 
that the litigant could do as he lacked the knowledge or legal expertise to know that a wrong 
was being or has been committed by his counsel. 
 
Holding 
However, the court discountenanced this erudite contention and held that: 
In arriving at the above conclusion, which is very obvious having regard to the law, I have taken 
into consideration the issue of substantial justice which is balanced on the other side of the scale 
of justice with the need to arrest the current embarrassing trend in legal practice when 
authentication or franking of legal documents, particularly processes for filing in the court have 
not been receiving the serious attention they deserve from some legal practitioners. Legal 
practice is a very serious business that is to be undertaken by serious minded practitioners 
particularly as both the legally trained minds and those not so trained always learn from our 
examples. We therefore owe the legal profession the duty to maintain the very high standards 
required in the practice of the profession in this country. The law exists as a guide for actions 
needed for the practice of law, not to be twisted and turned to serve whatever purpose, legitimate 
or otherwise which can only but result in embarrassing the profession if encouraged.3 
 
 
While this case lay down the principle that legal documents filed by a legal practitioner on 
behalf of a client signed in the name of his firm and not him personally, are incompetent, the 
lower courts have adopted this decision by stare decisis. They are unjustly stretching it to 
render incompetent processes which were signed by a legal practitioner on behalf of another 
legal practitioner without indicating the name of the signatory, as was in the cases of Peak 
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Merchant Bank v. Nigerian Deposit Insurance Commission4 and Adeneye v. Yaro.5 This slavish 
application of the principle enunciated in the case, is, with due respect, rather too wide, 
unjustifiably over stretched, extreme and capable of perpetuating avoidable injustice.  
 
The decision in the Okafor’s Case,6 has, pursuant to the revered doctrine of stare decisis, been 
followed in several other cases. A few will be examined. Firstly, Oketade v. Adewunmi7 the 
facts of which are that on the 31st day of May 1994, the Chief Magistrate Court, Ibadan 
delivered a judgment whereby it ordered the Appellant to deliver possession of the 
Respondent’s property he was occupying. He brought an application for stay of execution 
instead of vacating the premises and it was refused. He appealed the judgment to the High 
Court of Oyo State, Ibadan and praying for a stay of execution. This was granted and the 
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal on the failure of the Appellant to diligently 
prosecute the appeal after obtaining a stay of execution, the appeal was successful and the stay 
of execution was set aside. 
 
Being dissatisfied, the Appellant appealed the decision of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme 
Court. The Respondent raised a preliminary objection on the competence of the appeal on the 
ground that both the Notice of Appeal and Appellant Brief were signed by a legal practitioner 
known to law but by the law firm of ‘Olujimi and Akedolu.’ The Court took cognizance of the 
provisions of section 2(1) and 24 of the LPA and upheld the objection and dismissed the appeal 
because the processes were not duly signed as expected. It jettisoned the argument that the 
objection was a mere irregularity thus “where a court process is issued in the name of a firm 
and not in the name of a legal practitioner, it is not a mere technicality that can be brushed 
aside. It is fundamental to the judicial process. Such a process is incompetent, invalid, null and 
void.” 
 
In First Bank of Nigeria Plc. & Anor. v. Alh. Salmanu Maiwada8 the Supreme Court held that 
a Notice of Appeal signed by notice of appeal signed by ‘David M. Mando & Co.’ is 
incompetent and the appeal was liable to be struck out for want of jurisdiction. The Court made 
reference to the provisions of section 2(1) and 24 of the LPA and concluded that: 
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It is indeed clear in my humble opinion that the interpretation of the above provisions (i.e. sections 2(1) 
and 24 of the LPA, Order 51 Rule 1 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2009) is that it 
is the human person legally trained or termed a legal practitioner that is meant under those legislations 
above and only such persons and not a firm or group in the firm of legal practitioner come within the 
ambit of those two sections of the law. Therefore for the purpose of the authorizing signature, it is either 
the litigant himself or the human person who is the legal practitioner that can sign. 
 
 
It was contended by the Appellant that adherence to the decision in the Okafor’s Case,9 on the 
anchor of section 2(1) and 24 of the LPA, are mere technicalities but the Court vehemently 
refuted this on the ground that: 
 
The Legal Practitioners Act seeks to make legal practitioners responsible and accountable more 
especially in modern times. There is nothing technical in insisting that a legal practitioner should 
abide by the dictates of the law in signing court processes. The issue is not in the domain of 
public policy. The convenience of counsel should have no pre-eminence over the dictates of the 
law. The law as enacted should be followed. 
 
In fact, the appellant contended that given the fact that the law firm had been incorporated 
under part C of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) clothes the same with the vires 
to sign court documents. Thus, the process signed in the name of the law firm ought to be 
countenanced as proper. The court in rejecting this argument, held that: 
 
 
It is a misconception of the law to contend that a law firm registered as a business name under 
section 573(1) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act is entitled to practice and sign processes 
in its registered name. Section 573(1) of the Companies and Allied Matters Act is not an 
authority that can be relied upon to uphold the view that a process signed and filed by a firm of 
legal practitioners which has no life is valid in law. The general provisions of section 573(1) of 
the Companies and Allied Matters Act is subject to the specific provisions of section 2(1) and 
24 of the Legal Practitioners Act10 
 
In fact, the Court was comfortable in upholding this decision despite acknowledging that it 
would inflict avoidable untoward hardship on litigant when per Ckukwuma Eneh, JSC (as he 
then was) held that: 
I am aware of the hardship the decision has caused and is bound to cause. Notwithstanding 
even then that to hold otherwise may tend to hamper an apparent development of law. This is 
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so as the court has to interpret the law as it is and not to make or write it as it ought to be. The 
said provision of the Legal Practitioners Act has been strictly interpreted and have to be 
applied as prescribed therein no matter the hardship occasioned thereby as is the case in the 
two instant appeals.11 
 
With due respect to the above stated position of the court, while it is true that the duty of the 
court is to interpret the law and not make law, what is called the law, is not words printed on 
paper but the interpretation given to the printed words by the court, that is what becomes 
binding. That judges actually engage in law making (i.e. judicial legislation), is beyond 
controversy for anybody who has a minimum acquaintances with the history of common law. 
Decisions such as Donoghue v. Stevenson12 and Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners 
Ltd.13 became law based on the interpretation of the court. In fact, Oliver Wendell Holmes had 
emphasized that the life of the law was experience as well as logic.14 He contends that “the 
prophecies of what the court will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by 
the law…”15 In fact, it was through judicial legislation that the Supreme Court found for the 
Appellant in the celebrated case of Nasir Bello v. Attorney General of Oyo State16 where the 
court applied the maxim of ubi jus ibi remedium to find the killing of the appellants bread 
winner by the respondent while his appeal was pending, was a breach of his right to life. Thus, 
the excuse given by the court, under the circumstance, is with respect, not tenable. 
 
In the same vein, in SLB Consortium Ltd. v. Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation.17 The 
Supreme Court made the same pronouncement to the effect that the writ of summons signed 
by ‘Adewale Adesoka & Co.’ is incompetent as Adewale Adesoka & Co. is not licensed to 
practice law in Nigeria and cannot therefore signed any process filed before a court. The effect 
is that the court processes (writ of summons) purportedly signed by Adewale Adesokan & Co. 
“is not just bad but, is incurably bad and all proceedings, including the appeal founded on it,  
no matter how well adjudicated, is a nullity as the courts had no jurisdiction to be seised on the 
matter.18 
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This decision and others predicated on it, no doubt, have adversely affected many litigants and 
its effects are hereunder examined. The decision, is draconian and is an obliteration from the 
established position of law that the iniquity of the counsel should not be visited on the litigant 
or the litigant should not be punished for the fault of his/her counsel as was held in 
Majekodunmi v. Chrislieb Plc.19 In as much as it is appreciated that the rationale for the 
decision is to instill professional responsibility and accountability in legal professions in the 
discharge of their duties to the client, the court failed to recognize the fact that the processes 
presented by the legal practitioner were presented for and on behalf of a litigant, who most 
likely, is unaware of the intricacies of litigation but depends on his counsel and should not be 
exposed to hardship because of an error on the part of his counsel. Aside this, the processes so 
presented, bears the name of the litigant and are presented in exploitation of his right of access 
to court guaranteed by section 6(6)(b) of the 1999 CFRN which by sections 1(3) and 36(5)(c) 
thereof, are primus interpere20 and should be jealously guarded and only trampled upon 
sparingly when it has become totally unavoidable and justifiable. 
 
The question is, has the premature striking out of the case based on the irregular processes 
signed by the counsel “determined the civil right and obligation of the litigant” as contemplated 
by these sections of the 1999 CFRN? The answer, of course, is in the negative which ought not 
to be. It is worthy to note that the provisions of section 2 1) and 24 of the LPA are subservient 
to the provisions of section 6(6)(b) 1(3) and 36(5)(c) of the 1999 CFRN and ought to be so in 
their interpretation and application and not otherwise as done by the court. The resoluteness of 
the Supreme Court in preserving the sanctity of the provisions of section 2(1) and 24 of the 
LPA, with due respect, is shedding crocodile tears. 
 
In the absence of any express provision whether in the LPA or any other statute, stipulating the 
endorsement of the name and signature of the legal practitioner as later expatiated by the 
Supreme Court, the evidential rule of presumption of regularity ought to be invoked in favour 
of the court process. Once this is done, the onus will be on the party contending otherwise to 
established credibly, that the process was not signed by the legal practitioner who filed them. 
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In fact, the decision has become a sword, readily used at the slightest opportunity by defendants 
who have weak cases to terminate the claimant’s claim prematurely instead of allowing the 
matter to be litigated based on its merit. This grave injustice is rather unfortunate and should 
not be allowed to subsist beyond the time it has whenever the Supreme Court is presented with 
the opportunity to reappraise the situation. The reasoning by the Supreme Court that “no 
injustice is done to the litigant since the result of the irregularity an order striking out the suit 
or process which leaves the real legal practitioner with an opportunity to come back to the court 
to lift his veil and file a proper process as the legal practitioner whose name is on the roll of 
this court”,21 is to say the least, a denial of the fact of the slow pace of Nigeria’s justice delivery 
process. For a matter to get to the Supreme Court and be decided one way or the other, it is 
very likely that such a matter, if it were to be reinstituted, would have become statute barred. 
Once this unfortunate but avoidable situation set in, as it is most likely to, the litigant is left 
with a sterile cause of action which cannot be litigated because the time for its hearing has 
lapsed. 
 
The court, with due respect, came close to ascertaining a grave injustice in its insistence on the 
decision in the Okafor’s Case22, but did not acknowledge it with the seriousness that it requires. 
The fact that such a matter has been struck out because the counsel did not sign a process(es) 
in the way and manner it ought to and will become statute barred, or witnesses will die or 
become untraceable and unreachable or even if not, their memory of the event, would have 
succumb to memory diminishing return, ought to have guided the court, to treat the counsel 
mistake as a mere irregularity and hear the case on its merit.  
 
Moreover, a writ of summons, originally, is a process owned by the court and kept by it. The 
litigants are expected to go the court’s registry, after payment of prescribed fee, the claims are 
endorsed on the writ and the same is issued (by the Registrar affixing the seal of the Court) 
once this is done, it suffices. However, with the volume of cases being filed in court at present, 
it is practically impossible for the Court, through the Registrar, to be in possession of the writ 
or any other initiating processes but the litigant prepares it, and brings it for filing and all the 
endorsement that ought to be done by the court registry, is done. Once the Registrar seals the 
writ, after the endorsement of the claims, that should be regarded as sufficient and any other 
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thing, including, contemporaneously indicating the name and signature of the legal practitioner, 
should be treated as surplusage. 
 
Alternatively, poised to encourage substantial justice, the court should have held that all cases 
filed prior to the decision in the Okafor’s Case23 will be treated as haven been properly filed 
since that practice of signing court processes in the name of a law firm was not uncommon 
during that period. It should have not led the decision to affect matters already filed, but any 
matter that would be filed thereafter as it would be foolhardy for any legal practitioner, to 
continue in the practice after the decision. This would have mitigated the effect of the decision 
and given a human face to the law and not an entrenchment of technicality over substantial 
justice. This decision no doubt, is an extreme elevation of form over substance which works 
serious injustice polluting the stream of justice. 
 
Significance 
The issue of whether a law firm can sign legal process has receive attention in jurisdictions 
other than Nigeria. This section examines the position in jurisdictions such as the United 
Kingdom, the United States of America and Australia. In the US, Rule 11 of the Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure for District Courts24 states that while it does not permit a non-animate legal 
practitioner to sign a legal document, it makes room for correction of a legal document 
improperly signed at the earliest opportunity the mistake is brought to the knowledge of the 
legal practitioner. On signature, it provides that: 
 
Every pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least one attorney of 
record in the attorney’s name or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented. The 
paper must state the signer’s address and telephone number unless a rule or a statute 
specifically states otherwise, a pleading need not be verified or accompanied by an 
affidavit. The court must strike out an unsigned paper unless the omission is promptly 
corrected after being called to the attorney’s or party’s attention. 
 
 
While a document or paper not signed is bound to be struck out, this is only after the “unsigned” 
paper is brought to the attention of the party or their attorney to take remedial steps and these 
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steps are not taken. This shows that the court is more interested in having the suit determine on 
its merit than having it struck out inchoate because of not signing. While the benefit of signing 
after filing is opened to “unsigned paper”, it is most likely that it will be extended to improperly 
signed processes or paper in the interest of justice. 
 
In the United Kingdom, the issue of signing court processes by a law firm is adequately 
regulated by Rule 2.1 of the Practice Direction on Court Document (PDCD).25 The Rule 
provides that “statement of Case and other documents drafted by a legal representative should 
bear his/her signature and if they are drafted by a legal representative as a member or employee 
of a firm they should be signed in the name of the firm.” This provision legally permits a legal 
practitioner as an employee of a firm to sign a legal document either in their name or in the 
name of the firm unlike the position of the Supreme Court that permits only legal practitioners 
to sign legal documents. In fostering justice, the position in the UK is preferable to the principle 
laid down in the case under review.  
 
In New South Wales in Australia, corporations like law firms are legally permitted to engage 
in legal practice as “incorporated legal practice.” Section 14 (1) (2) of the Legal Practice Act26 
of New South Wales provides, among others things that “a person must not engage in legal 
practice in this jurisdiction unless the person is an Australian Legal Practitioner. Subsection 1 
does not apply to engaging in legal practice of the following kinds. Legal practice engaged in 
by an incorporated legal practice in accordance with part 2.6 (Incorporated Legal Practices and 
Multidisciplinary Partnership).” Section 134 of the Act defines incorporated legal practice as 
“a corporation that engages in legal practice in this jurisdiction, whether or not is also provides 
services that are not legal services.” Thus, in this jurisdiction, an incorporated practitioner can 
engage in legal practice and therefore sign legal processes in its incorporated name, it even 
permits them to offer service that are not legal. This position is not only commendable but it 
meets with the dynamics of society and legal practice as well. It is hoped that the Nigeria 
National Assembly will follow the laudable example and amend the LPA to permit 
incorporated/registered law firms, consisting of qualified legal practitioners, to engage in legal 
practice under its incorporated name or through the individual legal practitioners therein. 
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In Abdilkarim v. Incar (Nig.) Ltd.27 the Supreme Court held that it will not depart from its 
previous decision unless the party calling for it to do so is demonstrably able to show that: 
 
That the earlier decision is manifestly wrong and there is a real likelihood of it constituting a 
vehicle for perpetuating injustice by a rigid adherence to it; or that the decision was given per 
incuriam; or that it hinders the proper development of the law in which a broad issue of public 
policy was involved; or that it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution; it will 
cause temporary disturbance of rights acquired under it and it will continue to fetter the exercise 
of judicial discretion of a court.28 
 
 
In Fatoki v. Baruwa29 the Court of Appeal per Coram Kekere-Ekun JCA (as he then was) dealt 
with a case where the originating process was signed in the name of a law firm but was not 
raised by any of the parties, at the risk of being declared a persona non grata or judicial 
insubordinate. However, with a determination to facilitate the dispensation of substantial 
dispute, Kekere-Ekun JCA navigated through the murky waters of the decision in the Okafor’s 
Case. The court reasoned that since none of the parties raised the issue of the writ being signed 
in the name of a law firm instead of a legal practitioner licensed to practice law in Nigeria, it 
will not raise it suo motu because it is not an issue that would enable the court to do substantial 
justice. This step of judicial activism, although commendable, is capable of exposing the court 
to avoidable chastisement, although a court has the power to raise an issue suo motu and permit 
the parties an opportunity to address it on the issue, this duty is not iron cast as it is at the 
discretion of the court either to raise or not to raise an issue and it is guided by the demand of 
justice.30 
 
It is crystal clear that the right of access to court is guaranteed under the 1999 CFRN. A person 
who has a legal grievance, can pursuant to this right, seek redress in court personally or through 
a legal practitioner of his choice. If the person opts to litigate the cause of action through a legal 
practitioner, the legal practitioner must exercise due diligence in ensuring that the legal 
documents are properly franked. By being properly franked means signed by them personally 
and not in the name of a law firm. This is the position taken by the Supreme Court in the 
Okafor’s Case and a host of others. This decision which the Court justified on the need to instill 
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professional discipline in legal practitioners in the discharge of their duties, has created 
untoward hardship. The decision is criticized as failing to take to cognizance established 
principles of law such as that the mistake of a legal practitioner should not be visited on the 
litigant, initiating processes are ‘owned’ and ‘issued’ by the court although prepared by the 
litigants. The decision is a clear case of elevating form over substance by institutionalizing 
technicality at the expense of substantial justice. 
 
While the Supreme Court seems to have created an exception to the decision to the effect that 
cases commenced with initiating processes signed in the name of a law firm instead by the 
animate legal practitioner are not subject to the effect of the decision, it is doubtful whether, in 
the light of the implementation of the NBA stamp and seal regime, the decision has not become 
moribund and should be totally jettisoned in the overall interest of justice. It is the argument of 
this author that the decision is draconic and should be overruled forthwith. 
 
 
 
 
